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Indeed, the future looked bleak forIndonesia’s large conglomerates,
consumed by unsustainable debts and
last-ditch struggles to keep their assets
from creditors. Nor was Indonesia in
any position to resist the stringent IMF
conditions for rescue.1 Suharto’s
demise in May 1998 unravelled the
regime that had provided the frame-
work for the highly organised system
of KKN and triggered a series of polit-
ical and administrative reforms that
would not only transform Indonesia
into a formal democracy but shift
administrative authority to the
provinces and sub-provinces. Given the
wave of popular opposition to corrup-
tion,  a central feature of anti-Suharto
politics, here, surely, was the opportu-
nity for mass-based parties to form
around the issue of clean and account-
able government.
Dashed hopes
Yet, despite formal institutional reforms
and efforts at building ‘good gover-
nance’, it was soon clear that there
would be no unambiguous convergence
to liberal markets and politics. The
power relations that had previously
defined Indonesia proved remarkably
resilient, reconstituted within new
administrative and political frame-
works. Many of the same figures who
had occupied centre stage under the
Suharto regime remained pivotal play-
ers within the new power structures.
Most of the old conglomerates survived,
hanging onto assets, receiving govern-
ment bailouts and rebuilding political
relationships with the new political par-
ties. Not only were attempts to prose-
cute the corruptors of the Suharto era
ineffective, the whole mechanism of
corruption and rent-seeking survived in
a form that was, according to many neo-
liberal observers, more corrosive and
destructive because it was now more
arbitrary and less structured.2 No new
reformist parties emerged. Instead,
reformers were absorbed into the old
parties, which became machines to cap-
ture and distribute resources, colonised
by an army of opportunists, fixers and
stand-over men. They were democratic
to the extent that old arenas of patron-
age were now open to a wider assembly
of individuals.3
Are we witnessing in Indonesia a peri-
od of ‘savage capitalism’ as private inter-
ests are released to do battle in an
unconstrained marketplace? After all,
stock exchanges, corporations, parlia-
ments and financial systems in the early
years of market capitalism in Britain and
the US were characterised by corruption
and collusion of the grossest kind before
being progressively, but not wholly (as
the resurgence of cronyism in Bush’s
America illustrates), subordinated to a
systematic rule of law.
Will the new economic and political
entrepreneurs of Indonesia now be
forced to address the costs of crony cap-
italism by creating the institutions to
resolve their growing collective action
dilemmas – including the provision of
effective courts and an honest judiciary?
Will new democratic institutions open
the door to reformist forces? Or are we
seeing the natural evolution of a capi-
talist society as administrative oligarchy
collides with neo-liberal globalisation in
the early 21st century? Other similar
neo-patrimonial market hybrids have
shown amazing resilience. The Philip-
pines, for example, has been mired in
oligarchic money politics for more than
five decades despite deep immersion in
global markets.
Since the crisis and the fall of Suharto
optimism has waned. Even the World
Bank has admitted the loneliness of
reformist technocrats operating in an
indifferent and hostile environment.4
The failures of two presidents to drive
reform suggest that defeat and humili-
ation (in the case of Wahid) or co-option
and complicity (in the case of Megawati)
are the only possible outcomes when
dealing with powerful entrenched inter-
ests. But this view is balanced by argu-
ments that reform is a long road, that
the growing pressure of global markets
will ultimately open the way for a tri-
umph of technocratic rule and that lib-
erated civil society will generate grow-
ing popular authority over state
institutions.5
The logic of the machine
For many neo-liberal observers, includ-
ing those within the IMF, the Asian cri-
sis demonstrated the consequences of
trying to resist the inexorable logic and
discipline of global capital markets. The
lesson was that Thomas Friedman’s
anonymous and leaderless herds of
fund managers and global investors
would panic when they perceived the
transgression of the rules of the mar-
ketplace.6 According to this view, enjoy-
ing the benefits of global markets
requires governments to accept the fun-
damentals of good macro-economic pol-
icy and promote ‘good governance’, and
that corporate defaulters repay their
debts and repair their reputations if they
are to be accepted again into the global
marketplace.
But is reform in Indonesia really being
enforced by the discipline of global mar-
kets? Huge inflows of foreign direct
investment and other forms of financial
capital into Southeast Asia before the
crisis, made with the full knowledge that
corruption and rent-seeking were cen-
tral to the whole process of investment,
suggest that global markets and at least
certain forms of KKN can co-exist where
investors calculate (incorrectly in the
1990s as it turned out) that levels of
profits and promised political guaran-
tees will offset the risks. The slow recov-
ery of foreign investment in Indonesia
after the crisis may be the consequence
of perceived instability and uncertainty
in the organisation of KKN rather than
the fact of its continued existence. While
global investors have been frightened by
the difficulties of dealing with default-
ers and by the way commercial courts
and well-connected conglomerates have
colluded to avoid debt and bankruptcy,
the evidence suggests that they are pre-
pared to engage with former defaulters
where new opportunities seem to out-
weigh risks, especially in well-sub-
scribed floats on the Jakarta Stock
Exchange.7
We must also rethink the nature of those
global markets that determine the flow
of investment and finance into Indone-
sia and to extent to which they are now
dominated by pools of finance located
overseas by the very conglomerates that
fled the rupiah in 1997, often with funds
they had plundered from their own
expiring banks, and for whom KKN is a
normal and, indeed, necessary condition
for commercial success. We must also
assess whether the rise of China as a
new market and source of investment
for Indonesia implies rules of the mar-
ketplace quite different from those neo-
liberal principles assumed to be univer-
sal and immutable.
The reforming power of
institutions?
Many policy makers argue that the
behaviour of individuals can be altered
by constructing institutions that provide
different incentives and constraints on
choice. A key feature of IMF conditions
for financial bailout included the recap-
italisation of banks and new banking
regulations, the introduction of new
bankruptcy and commercial courts,
extended external auditing of govern-
ment departments, the establishment of
anti-corruption agencies, new adminis-
trative procedures and regulations to
control procurement and tendering.
State agencies that formerly allocated
monopolies and contracts, such as Per-
tamina and Bulog, were broken up or
their powers drastically altered.8 The
laws of 1999 opened the door for a sys-
tem of representative and decentralised
parliamentary government where soci-
ety would triumph over the state. 
Yet, while predatory and rent-seeking
coalitions can no longer organise their
power in the old ways, they have been
able to survive within the new institu-
tional frameworks. Money politics has
subsumed the new democratic political
systems.9 New legal and judicial
arrangements, banking regulations and
environmental regulations are often
ignored.10 The questions for policy-mak-
ers is not essentially about capacity or
program design but about politics: Why
are these institutional changes not
undermining entrenched interests or
strengthening reformist coalitions?
How are the former still able to attract
investment and finance from global
markets and under what conditions?
And what accommodations and
alliances must entrenched interests now
forge and how may these open the door
to unintended changes? 
A shift in power relations
It was widely expected that the fall of
Suharto would release a progressive and
reformist civil society from its long
hibernation and transform reformist
sentiments into political action through
new democratic and decentralised insti-





















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































When the Asian economic crisis struck Indonesia in 1997 it was generally thought to signal the end of a system of power defined by
the corrupt and collusive relationships of KKN (Korupsi, Kolusi dan Nepotisme). Surely the days of the crony were over, and their
corporate empires would be taken over by large international investors. 
Corruption, collusion and nepotism after 




to be a highly complex and internally-
divided entity where illiberal and preda-
tory elements were also released and
proved highly successful in shaping the
post-Suharto state. At the same time,
reformers found that entering politics
meant being drawn into the world of
money politics, where the scramble for
rents was the main currency for survival
and alliances with military and extra-
legal organisations were critical for
access to the resources of the black
market economy.
Must we therefore conclude that the
seismic political and institutional
reforms and upheavals have provided no
new effective avenues through which
reformist forces might impose their
interests? This apparently depressing
reality has driven the search for reform
and reformers into three different areas.
For neo-liberals, the path to reform is in
the relentless impact of global markets,
institutional reforms and the glacial
grinding away of reformist politicians
and technocrats from above. On the
other hand, many reformers outside the
neo-liberal camp look outside the
parliamentary arena to seek signs of real
reform among NGOs and grass roots
social movements. Others argue that the
grip of predatory alliances upon electoral
and party politics may be exaggerated
and that these new systems do offer
opportunities to throw out or prosecute
corrupt or unpopular politicians and for
aspiring politicians unconnected to the
main parties or the military to gain entry
into the world of politics in a way not
possible before.11
Indonesia provides a laboratory where
we can observe the collision of markets
with highly illiberal, populist and preda-
tory systems of power. It poses the ques-
tion of whether the reform process set
the country on an inevitable course
towards a grand liberal triumph of mar-
kets, democracy and ‘good governance’,
or whether the market dynamic is a
more sinister one that preserves or even
generates new systems of highly illiber-
al, regulatory state authority. <
Richard Robison is Professor of Political
Economy at the Institute of Social Studies,
The Hague.
